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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the
training Army Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) receive
from their units while they are not deployed, prepares them to
accomplish their mission during contingency deployments. This
was accomplished by examining previous contingency operations
for problem areas and determining whether the current CCO
training program is correcting these problem areas. The issues
were: garrison duties vs. duties on deployment, the
experience level of CCOs, training effectiveness, planning,
and assistance available to CCOs during deployments.
The results of this study indicate the Army needs to re-
examine the following areas: contracting experience of
officers assigned as CCOs, contingency contracting guidance,
specific duties of the CCO, training of Unit Ordering
Officers, and the feasibility of the overall contingency
contracting plan. This study recommends: using Non-
Commissioned Officers as CCOs, providing firm guidance for
contingency contracting, involving CCOs during early planning,
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The Army recently added two contingency Contracting
Officer (CCO) positions, Functional Area 97, to Division
Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&Es), one Major, 0-4,
and one Captain, 0-3. CCOs are Army Contracting Officers,
assigned to operational divisions that might be deployed
during contingency situations. They are the only military
Contracting officers assigned to divisions. Lieutenant
General William H. Forster, the Army's Director of Acquisition
Career Management, spoke to a group of officers during a visit
to the Naval Postgraduate School in the fall of 1992 and
implied that CCos were premier positions for Army Contracting
Officers. That meeting moved the researcher's thoughts toward
contingency contracting and more specifically, toward the
training CCOs received during garrison operations, i.e., non-
deployed, which increased their ability to become force
multipliers by contracting, during contingency deployments.
Prior to the end of the "Cold War", the Army's primary
mission focused on the European theater in support of the NATO
alliance. The logistical infrastructure was firmly entrenched
throughout the European theater with US support units as well
as Host Nation Support (HNS). Since the majority of US Army
divisions were dedicated to the European mission, contingency
forces consisted of the Rapid Deployment Force and Special
Forces.
The Army did not perceive a high priority need for
contingency contracting due to the preponderance of US support
and HNS units that were available in Europe, the dominant
theater of operations. With the current downsizing of the US
Armed Forces and the end of the "Cold War" threat from the
former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the Army faces a highly
diversified range of missions. During the past three years,
the Army has deployed forces to southwest Asia, Somalia,
Yugoslavia and now Macedonia. In each case, the logistics
support infrastructure was non-existent. When Army forces
deploy, they need the basic necessities to survive unduly
harsh conditions, especially in the cases of Saudi Arabia and
Somalia. In both cases, unlike the European theater, where
logistical support is in place, the contingency forces with
use of Contracting Officers had to establish logistics bases
from ground zero. Due to a lack of time for adequate
contingency planning and training for Contracting Officers,
the establishment of an adequate support base proved to be a
formidable task, especially during the initial stages of
deployments. Currently, CCOs must be capable of providing
adequate minimal support during early stages of operations, in
preparation for the arrival of support units such as Division
Support Command/Corps Support Command (DISCOM/COSCOM) into the
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theater of operations. The necessity of support for deployed
units is paramount to mi'-sion accomplishment. The following
quote demonstrates tVe importance of contingency contracting
in areas where US logistical support is not in place.
The United States Army has responsibilities that are
global, extending to wherever there are national
interests, obligations or commitments. The ability to
meet these responsibilities demands that the Army be
able to sustain itself in situations far from our
national shores and perhaps from the shores of our
NATO allies. Logistically, Army units will be the
most vulnerable when they are deployed outside
established logistical areas like Europe or Korea. In
these situations, Light Divisions and other highly
deployable formations could be expected to perform
their missions at the end of a very extended supply
line. That supply line will obviously have to give
priority to uniquely military supplies (i.e.
munitions, spare parts, etc.). Supplies that are not
uniquely military may be available in the local
economy. If so, the purchase of locally available
supplies or services would take some of the "pressure"
off what could be a nearly non-responsive supply line,
especially in the early phase of a deployment.
[Ref. l:p. 2]
The Army's answer to improve or meet the non-responsive supply
line was the introduction of the Contingency Contracting
Officer and the continued use of the Unit/Field Ordering
Officer (UOO/FOO). However, even though the CCO concept is a
step in the right direction to meet the logistical challenge,
there is no specific training in place which addresses
contingency contracting. This is especially apparent in the
initial stages of a deployment. In order to be responsive to
the needs of deployed forces the CCO has to be a positive
asset from the start.
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B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The basic objective of this research is to determine
whether the experience and training CCOs receive during non-
deployed operations prepares them for contracting during
contingency operations. There is ample evidence during recent
contingency deployments to determine a CCO's required duties.
In order to reach a conclusion about the basic objective, one
must understand the primary duties and responsibilities of a
deployed CCO as opposed to a non-deployed CCO. By contrasting
the duties of the deployed CCO with the non-deployed CCO, the
researcher attempts to discern whether the Installation
contracting training and experience is beneficial to the CCO
once he deploys on a contingency. To determine the training
non-deployed CCOS receive, the researcher canvassed
contracting professionals using a survey. The comparison of
the two will provide answers as to whether the current
training program is sufficient or needs to be changed.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: How should the Army
train and utilize Contingency Contracting Officers in order to
maintain the ability to execute their duties in the event of
a deployment? The subsidiary questions are:
1. What is the purpose of the CCO and what are the primary
duties of the CCO?
2. What are the unique contingency requirements of the CCO?
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3. What is the best method to obtain and maintain the CCO's
requisite skills?
4. Who are the principal sources of CCO assistance during
deployment periods and what training do those personnel
receive?
5. What deployment scenarios might a CCO face in the future
and how should the CCO be employed during preparation?
D. SCOPE
The main thrust of the study is to determine how the CCOs
should be utilized and trained during non-deployed periods, to
prepare them for a contingency situation. The Army assigns
two CCOs per active stateside division. If the personnel are
not utilized in the area of contracting, then the skills they
acquire at Advanced Civil Schooling and the Army Logistics
Management College are being under-utilized. The researcher
intends to determine whether the CCOs themselves feel there is
a need for improved training. The research will concentrate
on three main areas. The first area of research will attempt
to determine if the CCOs duties are commensurate with the
education and training provided by the Army Acquisition Corps
(AAC) for establishing a professional work force. The
research will explore the unique duties of the CCO and
evaluate how the Army plans to prepare CCOs in the event of
deployments that initially receive little logistical support.
Next, the research will investigate assistance available to
the CCO for carrying out his duties during a deployment. The
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final area of research will discuss possible deployment
scenarios for CCOs.
E. LIMITATIONS
One potential limiting factor for the study is that the
concept of the CCO is somewhat new. Another potential
limiting factor is the low number of CCO positions that are
currently occupied. The personnel system is lagging behind
the Army downsizing efforts currently underway. Some
divisions still have vacant CCO billets. The total number of
Army officers designated as Contracting Officers was reduced
by approximately 67% during the 1992 Qualification/Validation
board. The Army personnel system directed this reduction in
compliance with Department of the Army guidance.
F. ASSUMPTIONS
The researcher assumed the reader has knowledge of the
following information throughout the thesis:
1. The enormity of logistics requirements for deployed
forces.
2. The remoteness of the areas CCOs may deploy to.
3. Army communications equipment problems over long
ranges.
4. The command structure of the Army.
G. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research consisted of an extensive literature review.
The Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE)
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provided numerous articles on various areas of contingency
contracting. The information was used to develop a current
expectation of what CCOs should be able to do during a
deployment. A survey was conducted in questionnaire format
among current contracting professionals, including CCOs. The
purpose of the survey was to determine whether their training
prepares them for deployments. With this information, the
researcher was able to conduct a comparison of deployed vs.
non-deployed CCOs, and whether the training was helping to
solve problems discovered during previous contingency
deployments.
H. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions should aid the reader's
understanding of contingency contracting and contracting in
general:
A. Contingency Contracting - Contracting performed in
support of a peacetime contingency at an overseas
location pursuant to the policies and procedures of the
Federal Acquisition Regulation. [Ref. 2:p. 86]
B. Contingency - An emergency involving military forces
caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or
by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty
,f the situation, contingencies require planning, rapid
response, and special procedures to ensure the safety
and readiness of personnel, installations, and
equipment. [Ref. 3:p. 1)
C. Contrac i= - Purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise
obtaining supplies or services from nonfederal sources.
Contracting includes descriptions (but not
determination) of supplies and services required,
selection and solicitation of sources, preparation and
award of contracts, and all phases of contract
7
administration. It does not include making grants or
cooperative agreements. [Ref. 3:p. 1]
D. D - The relocation of the force to a desired
area of operations. [Ref. 4:p. 5)
E. Deation - Not to adhere to policy, procedure,
solicitation provision, contract clause, method, or
practice of acquisition actions conducted for any
reason, that is inconsistent with FAR or agency
regulations. [Ref. 4:p. 5)
F. Federal Acguisition Regulation - A regulation designed
to prescribe, structure and control the methods and
procedures by which business is conducted in a defined
segment of our economy--government procurement.
[Ref. 5:p. 107)
G. Q4 - Assistant Chief of Staff, (Logistics), the primary
staff officer responsible for logistics on a General
Staff.
H. egsjitin - The document submitted to a supply source
to obtain material. Requisitions may be transmitted by
message, telephone, or radio when time is of the
essence. [Ref. 6:p. A-20]
I. Small Purchase - The acquisition of supplies, non-
personal services, and construction for $25,000 or less
using small purchase procedures. [Ref. 6:p. A-20)
J. Waiver - To give up an advantage, privilege, or right;
and acknowledgement of the surrender of this advantage,
privilege, or right. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
I. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
The remainder of the thesis is organized in chronological
order. Chapter II presents problematic aspects of contingency
contracting from deployments within the last ten years prior
to Desert Shield. Chapter III will focus on contracting
during Desert Shield and the concept the Army has developed
for improving contingency contracting. Chapter IV presents
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the survey results and the analysis of the results. Finally,
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations




This chapter consists of information retrieved during a
literature review of documents concerning contingency
contracting over the past decade. First, the information
demonstrates the logistical need for contingency contracting
in the face of current mission changes affecting the Army.
Second, it looks at the placement of Contracting Officers
within organizations prior to the present policy of assigning
them to DISCOMs and COSCOMs. Third, it discusses shortcomings
in the contingency contracting arena over the last decade.
Fourth, the research presents specific CCO requirements that
emerged as a result of previous shortcomings. Finally, the
discussion examines previous training and education of
Contracting Officers prior to today's, and the problems that
resulted because the training did not prepare them for
contingencies.
B. CHANGING ARMY MISSIONS
During the last four years, the Army's population dwindled
from a peak of 781,000 to the present total of approximately
590,000. However, the list of contingency missions continued
to grow. Presently, the Army has forces deployed in Somalia,
Macedonia, Kuwait, and Egypt. The Administration is also
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considering sending a large contingent to Bosnia in the former
republic of Yugoslavia.
The downsizing of the Army and the changing of its
global mission will demand that the Army move quickly
and decisively. Army planners must recognize that
operations are hampered when deployed. The exclusion
of contracting capability has been a consistent
problem with the deployment of forces. The doctrinal
changes ongoing and those of the future place the Army
in a contingency posture. [Ref. 7:p. 4]
One of the major problems experienced during recent
historical deployments was the decision to deploy fighting
forces first, at the expense of concurrently establishing
logistical bases. The commander's need for logistical support
was not met, leading to logistical problems. From Napoleon to
Hitler, history has shown the importance of logistical
planning and the consequences of failing to adequately plan.
It seems the Army has learned lessons about the importance of
logistics.
As the scale and complexity of warfare have increased,
the importance of logistics to success in battle has
likewise increased. An Army's ability to marshall,
transport, and distribute large quantities of material
and maintain the men and equipment can make the
decisive difference between victory and defeat. [Ref.
7:p. 41]
In recent conflicts though, the logistics planning has been on
the lean side. Contingency contracting developed from the
need to provide immediate support to the deployed force. Even
a small force requires basic logistical support, e.g., food
and water. With the advent of the Rapid Deployment Force
(RDF), the Army has the ability to deploy a brigade-sized
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unit, approximately 3,000 soldiers, on short notice. The idea
of contracting for supplies and services during contingency
operations is not a new idea.
Logistics contingency plans at corps level and above
identify the acquisition of supplies and services as
a necessary function in all scenarios. The
logistics/contingency contracting interface is vital.
[Ref. 8:p. 33]
One aspect created by short notice RDF contingency deployments
was a reduction in the amount of time available for pre-
planning, especially in the area of logistics. As illustrated
above, military history has shown when time was available for
contingency planning, the results were usually more favorable.
C. ]PLACEMENT OF CONTRACTING OFFICERS
Prior to the current policy of assigning CCOs to DISCOMs
and COSCOMs, Contracting Officers wore dual hats. They were
assigned to a procurement office on post and were required to
support operational units during deployments. They had no
familiarity with the deployed units' needs as the following
example alludes:
The procurement branch is responsible both to
requiring activities within the 1st COSCOM, and to
requiring activities elsewhere within the Corps, such
as divisional and non-divisional units. As the
procurement branch does not interact with these units
in peacetime, it is ill-prepared to do so during
contingency operations. [Ref. 8:p. 31]
The establishment of a good working relationship, familiarity
with the needs of the unit, and involvement in the planning
phases, would have increased the Contracting Officer's
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effectiveness in support of the deployed force. The following
quote provides an explanation of why a Contingency Contracting
Officer needs to be involved in the logistics planning
process.
As contingency contracting is a recognized alternative
for solving logistics shortfalls, it is illogical to
contemplate the contingency contracting function and
the G4 staff element being divorced one from the
other, especially during contingency operations. With
no present peacetime interaction, and with limited
staff authority, it is obvious that the procurement
branch is not optimally placed. It is interesting to
note that the perceptions of those most involved with
contingency contracting are, that some senior staff
officers know nothing about the mechanics of
procurement, except that if funds are expended
improperly, grave consequences follow. The
observation was made that procurement is held to be a
potentially embarrassing and legally hazardous
function that is better left to the subordinate
logistics operators, rather than to risk one's career.
[Ref. 8:p. 32-33]
The lack of CCO support capability knowledge on behalf of
senior staff officers, the major players in Army planning
processes, was a major impediment in their ability to use CCOs
to support deployed forces in an efficient manner.
The following statement, extracted from a paper written in
1984, persisted as policy, in principle, until the Army
finally decided to assign CCOs to divisions.
A fragmented grouping of uncoordinated contingency
contracting organizations exists in the United States
Army today. These organizations perform very esoteric
contingency contracting functions for the specific
military units to which they are assigned. Often,
there is little upward, downward, or lateral flow of
information or interaction regarding contingency
contracting. (Ref. 8:p. 27]
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The lack of communication between the CCO and the unit
preparing for deployment resulted in less than optimal support
of the deployed forces. If the Army had extended its
"Continuation of the present 'Hey, You' method of selection in
designating contracting officers/ordering officers," (Ref.
l:p. ii] the lack of familiarity concerning needs of the unit
would continue to impede the CCO's efforts to provide
effective support to the unit. A previous study gathered the
following information from some Contracting Officers' points
of view.
The consensus of those interviewed was to have a
contracting officer responsible for each division.
Not, however, assigned to the division. This
contracting officer would handle all the contract
actions above $2,500 and monitor the actions of
ordering officers in the division. It was felt that
the bulk of purchases could be obtained at the
battalion level by organic personnel trained as
ordering officers. The reduction of the small
purchase requirements would enable the KOs to
concentrate on large purchases and focus on the
negotiating and administrative aspects of their
function. [Ref. 7:p. 38]
The assignment of a CCO to a unit, responsible for supporting
contingency missions in which the division deployed, would
help to avoid the learning curve gap which results when
unfamiliar Contracting Officers are called out to deploy with
units they do not ordinarily work with. If they were able to
participate in the planning process, they would be able to
provide better support to the deployed forces during
contingencies.
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D. INADEQUACIES IN CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING
Throughout the last decade, the experiences of CCOs have
proven to be less than adequate in support of deployed forces.
The failure to assign them to a specific unit, in a position
where they were involved in the planning process, led to
various problems. The following example demonstrates some of
the pitfalls that can occur when Contracting Officers are not
normally associated with the unit they deploy with.
A third example of contingency contracting
inadequacies occurred during a training deployment to
Jordan. Many administrative problems occurred, from
late notification of the contracting officer's
deployment to his not supporting his own unit. The
contracting officer was not aware of the many
contractual agreements that existed between the US and
Jordan. Also many of the requirements that he was
expected to purchase required close coordination with
the local military. Many of the required services
were only available through the military causing many
procedural problems. [Ref. 7:p. 31]
Problems such as the aforementioned are bound to happen when
CCOs lack familiarity with specific unit needs upon arrival.
Including them in the planning would have alerted them to the
circumstances involved in the exercise. Situations such as
the Jordan training exercise left commanders with negative
impressions of the Contracting Officers. They were not
considered combat multipliers at all. In fact, they were
perceived by the Commander as a weak link, requiring much
attention and continuous corrective action.
The military Logistics Directors, in conjunction with
OSD, have determined that a weakness in support during
contingency operations has been on-the-scene
contracting. [Ref. 9:p. 42]
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Another weak area for Contracting Officers during previous
deployments was their lack of hands-on experience. The
Contracting Officers did not spend enough of their careers in
contracting positions. The Army would send them to a school
to obtain a basic understanding of contracting, and assign
them to a contracting position at various locations throughout
the Army. They would work as Contracting Officers for a three
year period known as a nominative assignment. Some were on
installations with operational units and some were not. When
the Army deployed forces to Grenada, the following situation
occurred:
When the contracting section from the Material
Management Center of the 1st COSCOM did deploy, the
contracting officers were ineffective, through no
fault of their own. They had recently received
formalized training but had no actual contracting
experience. Because of their duty position they did
have warrants to contract outside of CONUS. [Ref.
10:p. 21]
Government Service employees performed the majority of the
contracting functions in the Army during that period of time
and continue to do so today. These civilians have the hands-
on experience that is desperately needed by CCOs.
The variety of contracting skills needed to make
Contingency Contracting work is presently concentrated
in a highly civilianized workforce at the Army
installation level. This force is not immediately
deployable . Those uniform Army personnel that are
trained in contracting are almost all officers. Few
of these officers have the installation level skills(i.e., small purchases, services, minor construction,
etc.) needed. [Ref. l:p. 3]
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In Grenada, the lack of contracting experience, along with
inadequate planning, highlighted the problems encountered by
Contracting Officers.
The Army doctrine of being prepared was violated
because the logisticians were not included in planning
prior to the deployment of the Rangers. The original
concept was to place as many "fighters" on the ground
as possible and that they would need little or no
combat service support (CSS). The Corps Support
Command (COSCOM) was unable to deploy an entire
package of CSS so sustainment items like fresh fruit,
water, and fuel were bartered for or confiscated from
local sources. Ordering officers, not fully
understanding their responsibilities and liabilities,
were afraid to spend money to purchase needed items.
The two contracting officers who deployed from the Ist
COSCOM did not have experience in local purchase
procedures and as a result, the Fort Bragg Directorate
of Contracting deployed civilian contracting officers
to Grenada for a few days at a time in order to let
contracts. [Ref. 10:p. 5]
Lessons learned from Grenada operations pointed to flaws in
the planning phase prior to Operation Urgent Fury. One flaw
was the belief that any UOO could obtain critical supplies or
services, with minimal training, without critical logistical
support. Another flaw was the belief that Contracting
Officers could provide the necessary support with minimal
training and hands-on experience in purchasing.
While Army logistical doctrine espouses the
acquisition of local supplies to meet the needs of a
rapidly deploying unit, logisticians have overlooked
the importance of this guidance, and they have done so
repeatedly. [Ref. ll:p. 5]
The presence of a CCO during the planning phases of an
operation might have enabled the inclusion of contracting
issues as a critical piece of the logistics annex of the
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operations order. Unfortunately, the Army, until recently,
only used the Contracting Officer in a reactive role instead
of a proactive one. The following statement was written in
1986, but held true until the Army established a concept for
contingency contracting in 1992.
Army CC is fatally flawed but realistically designed.
Its systematic flaws are lack of definition, mission,
regulation, etc. There is no plan to implement this
capability within the existing structure. In this
regard, the Army is outclassed by one of its sister
services - the US Air Force. The Air Force has
published a regulation on this subject - AF Regulation
70-7, Contingency Contracting Support Program - which
requires each of its major commands and installations
to develop supplemental implementing plans. This
regulation, in fact, institutionalized this capability
throughout the Air Force. (Ref. 11:p. 33]
The Army has been working on a manual for contingency
contracting, but it has not been finalized as of the
completion of this writing.
E. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
The requirements placed upon CCOs demand they work in an
entirely different manner than they are use to. While
deployed in support of forces during contingencies, they no
longer have an experienced civilian contracting safety net to
rescue them in troubled waters. The CCO has to procure items
needed for unit mission accomplishment. A previous study
produced the following requirements for CCOs:
First, the critical demands of a contingency
contracting situation are:
1. That contracting professionals can award contracts
in a timely matter under urgent conditions within
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the constraints of the "peacetime" laws and
regulations.
2. The characteristics of a typical contingency are
subject to change without warning.
3. The inexperience of commanders and customers in
utilizing contracting can prolong the procurement
cycle and causes problems.
4. Courtesies, customs, traditions, and security
threats provide barriers when contracting in a
foreign country.
5. Repetitious administrative procedures required by
a "peacetime" acquisition system are carried out
in this type of environment.
Second, contracting professionals can best be
prepared for contingency contracting situations by
developing their skills in peacetime contracting
positions. [Ref. 4:p. 74-75)
During contingency operations this list of requirements poses
some interesting situations for relatively inexperienced CCOs
to overcome. One problem is the fact that contracting in the
US during peacetime is difficult enough to do, let alone in a
country with a different language, different customs and
different business procedures. In remote foreign areas,
merchants know they have a customer in need and can set prices
as they please, especially if they are the sole source.
Another major problem is the lack of knowledge on behalf of
commanders of the particular laws and regulations imposed on
the CCOs. The Army's dedication to mission accomplishment at
all costs places the CCO in the unenviable position of having
to explain situations to commanders that they do not want to
hear regarding services and supplies. For example, if a
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requirement for an item surfaces, and the contracting or Army
regulations prohibit acquisition prior to meeting certain
guidelines, e.g., FAR, AFARS, the CCO faces a dilemma. Should
he obtain the item and request ratification or follow the
prescribed procedures which may be detrimental for the unit?
Choosing the second option led to a perceived weakness of
CCOs' capabilities from the eyes of the logistical field
leaders. That perceived weakness persists due, in part, to
the lack of an adequate concept to change the way Army CCOs
are trained and utilized.
As previously stated regarding guidance for CCOs, the
Army, in comparison to the Air Force, was behind the power
curve. The following information appears in the Air Force
Contingency Contracting Handbook:
One of the first things CCOs need to do is to make
themselves known to the on-scene commander, potential
customers.., contracting is there to support the unit
... the CCO can avoid ratifications by getting
involved early in the process.
The second objective is to develop a simple,
straightforward way for customers to submit
contracting requirements.... For supply requisitions,
what is needed is a good item description from the
requiring activity and the requestor's name.
The CCOs responsibilities for supplies buying is
more encompassing during deployments than during
peacetime. There are several reasons for this.
First, lack of reliable communications in many
contingency areas makes it necessary to travel to the
vendor's location. Secondly, most business will be
"cash and carry" which requires the CCO to officially
receive and deliver items on behalf of the customer.
There are times, of course, when the CCO will not have
to make delivery.
Contracting may receive a number of purchase
requests for items which are not available in the
immediate area but are possibly available at a
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location serviced by another contracting office. If
the deployment base has routine military flights to
and from another installation, the CCO may satisfy
requirements by "referring" the purchase requests to
another contracting office in the area.
It cannot be overemphasized how important it is to
accurately document all purchases. Since normal
checks and balances may not exist during contingency
situations, CCOs can be assured auditors will be
interested in all paperwork when the unit returns
home. Proper forms and formats are not nearly as
important as having complete and accurate information,
even if it is on a plain piece of paper.
While an accurate list of actual requirements at
every contingency location is not possible, it is
useful. to have an idea of what was required during
past deployment exercises. This can help in
determining the types of catalogs (preferably those
with pictures) CCOs need to take in contingency kits.
[Ref. 12:p. 5-7]
Although this list was only a sample of what is included in
the AF guidebook, the topics stimulate thought in regards to
CCO job description. From the AF requirements discussed
above, the Army should begin to address a method to train its
CCOs to meet the high demands.
F. TRAINING
The Army has overlooked the issue of proper training for
CCOs.
Many deployment after-action reports have highlighted
the lack of any training or preparation by those
personnel suddenly entrusted with contracting
responsibilities. As officers of any branch may be
called upon to act as ordering officers or contracting
officer representatives during a deployment, a
comprehensive short course and reference material
package should be made available to combat and combat
support officers.... [Ref. 3:p. B-l]
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The previous statement was extracted from the Army's
Operational Concept for Contingency Contracting (Draft). The
importance of specific CCO training is still inadequately
addressed. The draft concept failed to address the unique
situations CCOs have to contend with. According to the Army's
contingency contracting concept,
The "basic" training required for contracting officers
is, however, the same for all levels of contracting.
Those variations particular to contingency contracting
should be provided within existing programs. [Ref.
3:p. B1]
As demonstrated during the problems in Grenada, the "basic"
training may be the same, but the variations have not been
adequately addressed. The following information helps explain
why.
Both officers assigned to the Procurement Branch, AC
of S, Materiel, 1st COSCOM, Ft Bragg, NC, had no
previous procurement assignments. Both were recent
graduates of the Management of Defense Acquisition
Contracts Course (Basic). The chief of the branch had
only graduated one month prior to being deployed to
Grenada. [Ref. 8:p. 47]
After reading the requirements placed on CCOs, it should be
fairly obvious to anyone familiar with Army operations, that
contingency contracting and installation contracting are not
synonymous. Depending on a CCO's experience during garrison
operations, some similarities may exist. However, the
environment during contingency situations is still very
different due to the hands-on nature of the requirements along
with the foreign aspect. The assignment of new, inexperienced
Contracting Officers to contingency positions is not the
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optimal situation. The following quote explains the main
responsibility of every office responsible for training CCOs.
Contingency contracting officers should be properly
trained. Every contracting office should ensure that
each individual tasked as a contingency contracting
officer is trained in contingency contracting. [Ref.
9:p. 31]
The preceding statement sounds simple but one problem with
developing generic training plans for CCOs is the uncertainty
as to where the next contingency will be. Failure to properly
train CCOs for region-specific business customs results in
situations such as the following example experienced by the
Air Force:
One interviewee suggested that training should be
improved. Although there are some experienced
contingency contracting officers, the majority of the
contracting officers in TAC lack experience. The
following example illustrates how lack rf training and
experience may affect performance.
During an exercise a new contingency contracting
officer told the using organization that three sources
were required on a form 9 to order supplies. The
using organization stated that there were not three
sources for the supplies within the country. The
contracting officer told the organization that if they
did not have three sources they could not get the
supplies. An experienced contingency contracting
officer corrected the problem, procured the supplies,
and explained to the new contracting officer that the
primary job is to support the deployed unit. [Ref.
9:p. 29]
Although the example was from an Air Force study, the result
was similar to experiences by Army CCOs during Operation
Urgent Fury. The training methods utilized thus far by the
Army result in a less than favorable perception of contingency
contracting by the Army's leaders.
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G. SUMMARY
This chapter has shown various problematic aspects of
contingency contracting from recent operations. First, it
discussed changes to the Army's mission and how contingency
contracting became more critical to meet the changes. Second,
it addressed the placement of Contracting Officers in units
and whether the units were utilizing them in the planning
process. Third, the research covered previous contracting
inadequacies during contingency operations. Following the
discussion of inadequacies, the specific requirements for CCOs
were addressed. Finally, the study discussed training for
CCOs to determine whether the training was sufficient to
prepare them for contingency missions or not.
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III. THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
A. INTRODUCTION
Contingency contracting is in an evolutionary stage.
Desert Shield experiences taught the Army that it needed to
improve its contingency contracting capability. Only then
could the CCO become a force multiplier. They realized the
CCO must be able to meet the needs of deployed forces in order
for units to accomplish their missions. Therefore, to meet
these needs, changes must be made in the training, assignment
and utilization of CCOs, and in their regulatory guidance.
Contracting can and will play a significant part in the
logistical support of future Army and joint force
contingencies. Improvement must occur before forces deploy.
By training Contracting Officers and by integrating
contracting into overall force planning, the CCO should become
a force multiplier from the beginning of the deployment. By
providing adequate regulatory guidance, CCOs should receive
training which will enable them to support deployed forces.
In order to show how the Army recognized the need for improved
contracting support in its contingency concept, this chapter
will discuss various problem areas Contracting Officers
encountered during Desert Shield. As one can imagine,
complications faced in everyday contracting during normal
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conditions are magnified during contingency situations. The
situation the XVIII Airborne Corps Acquisition Section (CAS)
faced during the early stages of deployment for Desert Shield
provides many observations and examples of what can go wrong
during contingency operations.
B. DESERT SHIELD
1. Problems with Regulations
The XVIII Airborne CAS experience during Desert Shield
included:
The initial,and largest, difficulty encountered was
determining the FAR, DFARS, and AFARS applicability
under wartime conditions. These regulations do not
contain specific guidance concerning contingency
operations, nor do the procedures outlined in these
regulations lend themselves to contingency operations.
There was simply not enough time to follow all the
normal contracting procedures. Because of the urgency
to obtain goods and services, we often completed the
acquisition process of solicitation, negotiations and
award in five days. [Ref. 13:p. 2]
The regulations cited above are cumbersome enough in peacetime
let alone contingency operations. Dealing with unique
requirements in a foreign country under circumstances such as
those encountered during Desert Shield added a new dimension
to contracting. That new dimension is what makes contingency
contracting such a challenge. There has not been enough
emphasis placed on contingency contracting as evidenced by the
lack of guidance provided on the subject in the FAR, DFARS or
AFARS. In retrospect, this disparity occurred in part for
reasons related to the inception of the acquisition
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regulations to begin with. They were developed in order to
consolidate and standardize the voluminous amount of
procurement documentation, while simultaneously attempting to
enhance the ability of Government agencies to acquire material
and services in the US, at reasonable costs to the taxpayers.
For DoD in particular, the regulations pertain to all
contracts. They were developed with the intention of
controlling the acquisition of high dollar systems and
services in order to control waste and abuse in the
acquisition process, and to improve the overall efficiency of
the Contracting community. Contingency contracting is not
addressed by regulations.
Some problem areas associated with regulations during
Desert Shield include: "cost and pricing data, full and open
competition, DLA approval for centrally managed items, and
determination of responsibility." [Ref. 13:p. 7-9]
Additionally, the Procurement Integrity Act adds unnecessary
requirements. "Completion of a contract pricing proposal is
much too complicated for many third world businessman.... "
[Ref. 13:p. 8] The complex nature of completing proposals in
accordance with the FAR was incompatible with the urgency
required to procure materials or services in support of
deployed forces. Support of these forces is the intended
purpose of sending CCOs on contingency operations.
Ironically, many US contractors are unable to comply with the
laborious requirements for providing cost and pricing data.
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Consequently, it is ludicrous to expect foreign contractors,
with different cultures and business practices, to be able to
comply, especially considering the urgency of requirements.
The "... increased urgency of acquisitions and the often
limited sources of supply in third world countries" [Ref.
13:p. 8] added to the difficulties of obtaining full and open
competition in compliance with FAR requirements. In emergency
cases, sole source, with justification and approval, is an
acceptable exception for the military to use to meet urgent
needs. As long as the CCO is able to obtain approval, there
is not a problem. However, when a conflict arises, e.g., the
item is available through the supply system, and approval is
not granted, the commander still wants the item "now". He
does not want to hear about contracting requirements.
Although some regulatory requirements are waiverable, the
problem remains, i.e., the regulations do not provide the
basis for the CCO to complete the mission of supporting the
force in the most efficient manner.
2. The Supply System
Due to the circumstances surrounding contingency
operations, the normal supply system fails to adequately meet
the requirements. The supply system procedures are directly
responsible for some problems during contingencies.
Commonly needed supplies, which are required on a
recurring basis and that the Army supply system has
failed to supply in an adequate quantity, normally
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does not allow waiting for DLA approval to make the
acquisition in a contingency environment. [Ref. 13:
p. 8]
Based on the urgency of the situation, waiting for DLA
approval on centrally managed items could be the difference
between life and death. This was especially true for the
earliest forces deployed for Desert Shield. For example, in
the case of sandbags, "... the immediate requirement was for
hundreds of thousands.... The supply system was only
supplying hundreds" [Ref. 13:p. 8] Thus, the regulations or
a new contingency policy need to address such specific problem
areas which require the CCO to diverge from regulations.
Having served in Saudi Arabia, and remembering waiting for
parts to arrive, it was readily apparent that the supply
system was incapable of fulfilling the urgent needs for
equipment to support the soldiers. CCOs and UOOs provide an
invaluable service by bridging the gap in existing supply
lines for items that can be purchased locally as needed. In
the researcher's case, positive results of contracting were:
the availability of laundry service, personal hygiene
facilities, and a generator to provide electricity for light
sets.
3. Determination of Responsibility
The question of responsibility comes up in every
contracting decision. During Desert Shield, CCOs'
unfamiliarity with the business customs increased the
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difficulty of the decision. Unlike US contractors who are
required to comply with the provisions of the FAR, the Saudis
had a completely different way of conducting business.
First, a preponderance of businessmen in third world
countries are general traders. Thus very few of the
materials on which a contractor may quote are actually
in stock and directly under the contractor's control.
[Ref. 13:p. 9]
Without knowledge of a source's prior pertormance, and an
urgent need to acquire an item, the CCO faces additional risk
every time he contracts for items the contractor does not have
on hand. He must consider whether or not the contractor can
actually deliver the requisite item, whether the contractor
has the means to deliver the item to an agreed upon rendezvous
location, and whether the quality of the product meets the
specifications of the purchase request. And then comes the
matter of price. Without a base knowledge of the local
market, the CCO is at a particular disadvantage. In addition
to whether the contractor is responsible, he must make the
decision as to whether the price is fair and reasonable.
In addition to the problems with foreign merchants,
units often fail to clearly state their needs.
The CAS received DA Form 3953 that contained little or
no useful information that would allow purchase of an
item. The units wanted something, but could not tell
the contracting officer exactly what they wanted.
Realizing that the units were sometimes hard pressed
for time and in need of the requested item, the
contracting officer would try to read the mind of the
requesting unit. [Ref. 13:p. 15]
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The uncertainty of what the unit actually required compounded
the difficulty for determination of responsibility. Though
the proactive efforts of the CCOs in trying to decipher the
requirement were commendable, those efforts were not the most
efficient or effective use of their time. To be more
efficient, they should have immediately requested the unit to
clarify the requirement in order to acquire the correct item.
The purchase request needs to fully specify the requirement.
Only then can the COO determine the requirement and whether a
contractor can fulfill the requirement. Providing any less
specificity causes confusion and frustration for the
commander, who receives the wrong item, consequently requiring
the CCO to start the process again. The lack of a peacetime
communication system to obtain corrections in a timely manner
was also a limiting factor for the CCO. Faced with these
types of situations, the CCO was unreasonably challenged with
making determinations of responsibility.
4. The Procurement Integrity Statute
During Desert Shield, the provisions required by the
Procurement Integrity Statute placed an unnecessary burden on
the CCOs, in that:
Most businessmen dealt with during this operation did
not understand the reason or the requirement... and
usually would sign anything in order to make a sale.
[Ref. 13:p. 9]
The Saudi merchants' business customs differed from those of
US contractors. There was no reason to impose the provisions
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of the statute on Saudi contractors. The Procurement
Integrity Statute prohibits the following actions:
... (1) offering future employment or business
opportunity to a Government procurement official; (2)
giving any money, gratuity, or other thing of value to
a procurement official; (3) soliciting or obtaining
any proprietary or source selection information
concerning a procurement from a procurement official.
[Ref. 15:p. 2-13]
Saudis were unfamiliar with US law, and who could blame them,
they were not required to comply with it in their country.
The possibility of the statute applying to contracts in Saudi
Arabia was not likely. Desert Shield offered Saudis a chance
to make extra money. However, the merchants did not always
want to sign contracts. Many preferred to deal in cash.
There is a general distrust in financial institutions.
It is not unusual to see a Saudi walk into a bank or
money exchange and open a large briefcase filled to
the brim with bills of large denominations; many
employees may request to be paid in cash each payday.
[Ref. 14:p. 13]
Since the practice of cash and carry was prevalent, the Saudi
businessmen expected to be paid at the time of the
transaction. The Saudis wanted the business but did not want
to adjust their business customs to comply with US laws. The
Procurement Integrity Statute administrative provisions seem
non-applicable in foreign countries.
5. Training of Contingency Contracting Officers
The CCOs' training prior to arrival in Saudi Arabia
did not prepare them to conduct contingency contracting. They
were not familiar with problems caused by Saudi business
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customs, the climate, the hands-on work involved, lack of
knowledge regarding sources, or the increased urgency of
needs. They were trained to work as Contracting Officers at
Installation DOCs, where there are civilian experts to rely on
when CCOs can not solve their own problems.
The ALMC preparatory course for Contracting officers
concentrated on preparing students for formalized
contracting in a fixed and stable environment. No
mention was made of contracting in a contingency
environment such as Desert Shield. [Ref. 13:p. 19]
Whatever the level of experience of the Contracting Officers,
the culture shock upon arrival in Saudi Arabia complicated
matters. The culture, customs, and weather were completely
different from Installation contracting. The change in
atmosphere between working in an Installation Directorate of
Contracting, and working out of a tent in the desert, took
quite an adjustment. The CCOs had to locate sources, make
their own living and transportation arrangements, and arrange
for the arrival of follow-on units. They had to arrange
transportation for thousands of troops in just days. They
also had to overcome a language barrier. In addition to the
problems listed above, the need to deploy quickly prevented
prior planning that normally precedes a deployment.
Units deploying on an exercise or an actual emergency
deployment such as Desert Shield cannot fully
anticipate all requirements before deploying; many
immediate requirements can only be identified and
filled once the unit arrives at their deployment
location. [Ref. 13:p. 1]
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Due to the shortage of planning time, the initial workload for
the CCOs was enormous. This added burden compounded the CCO's
responsibilities until follow-on support units arrived.
6. Unit Ordering Officers
During Desert Shield, UOOs reduced some of the
workload for the CCOs. However, the UOOs also contributed to
the problems faced by the CCOs.
Unit ordering Officers are limited in the types of
items they may purchase such as no personal comfort
items or ADPE. There were instances where ordering
officers bought these, and other unauthorized items in
violation of their appointment letter. Failure by
their unit's chain of command to monitor and check
these abuses placed a further strain on the CAS. [Ref.
13:p. 10]
The CCOs appointed the UOOs and briefed them on their duties.
UOOs could not be fully monitored because they worked for
their unit commander. However, the "CCOs were responsible for
monitoring the ordering officers funds and purchases." [Ref.
13:p. 10] The task did not seem to be so difficult until the
research revealed "740 UOOs procured close to $13,000,000
worth of supplies and services." [Ref. 13:p. 10] The
geographical dispersion of units during Desert Shield
compounded the task of monitoring UOO activities. The UOOs
also displayed a lack of knowledge as to what their limits
were.
Unit ordering officers need to be more familiar with
the limits of their appointment. This should be
completed, if possible, at the home station prior to
deployment. There is insufficient time to ensure a
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thorough briefing of officers after arrival within the
theater of operations. [Ref. 13:p. 23]
CCOs should have ensured proper training took place prior to
deployment. Once CCOs deployed, they did not have the luxury
of additional time to train UQOs. Reading a briefing about
what a UOO's limitations are should not constitute a UOO
training program. It could almost be called negligence on the
part of CCOs and commanders, considering some UOOs were
untrained, aside from an "initial briefing concerning their
duties" [Ref. 16:p. 2], yet they "were appointed to purchase
urgently needed items valued at less than $2,500.00" [Ref.
13:p. 1] without violating any rules. The problem is the
definition of an urgent need. An urgent need to one person
may not coincide with what someone else thinks. The UOOs were
rated by their unit commanders, and based on the commander's
perceived needs, it was likely that some UOOs were pressured
into purchasing supplies they should not have bought. The
commander's perception may not have coincided with the UOO's
standard procedures. During contingencies, documentation of
purchases is very important in accounting for funds.
Records of purchases made by the unit ordering
officers was another area of concern to the CAS.
Several unit ordering officers destroyed their recordsjust prior to the beginning of the ground
offensive.... [Ref. 13:p. 10]
The UOOs' actions destroyed the audit trail of their
purchases. Without the trail, the units lost accountability
for funds used and equipment purchased. In addition to this
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blunder, a memorandum from 1st COSCOM cited three additional
problems concerning UOOs:
(1) Units utilized UOOs to bypass the supply system
because little work was involved. This negated the
ability to build demand histories within the supply
system and to allow the supply system to work as
designed.
(2) Unit commanders, on numerous occasions did not
become a(.ively involved in their UOOs' actions until
threat of CID investigation or fund authority
withdrawal occurred.
(3) Because COSCOM received units from different
stateside locations, many Ordering Officers were
placed on orders from different Contracting Officers.
These Contracting Officers had different procedures,
which caused confusion throughout COSCOM. [Ref. 17:p.
20-2]
The assistance the UOOs offer the CCO outweighs the negative
effects presented in this section. However, proper training
prior to deployment can help avoid the occurrence of such
problems.
7. Management of Contracting Officers
During Desert Shield, the XVIII Airborne CAS
consolidated all CCOs into one large section. They justified
doing so as a precautionary measure against possible conflicts
of interest that might arise between CCOs and logisticians
within the divisions. Even though units deploy during
contingency operations, the CCO is still guided by FAR
requirements. Staff personnel could easily apply pressure to
the CCO to perform illegal actions. An example would be to
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force the splitting of requirements to meet the small purchase
threshold. This is clearly a violation of the FAR.
AFARS 1.6 warns that contracting officers should not
be assigned to positions where interdepartmental
pressure might lead the contracting officer to perform
improper acts that expose the individual to personal
risk and subject the Army to criticism. When
contracting officers provide direct support to
division size and smaller units, the potential for
inappropriate pressure on the contracting officer to
fill local purchase needs, regardless of the
methodology, increases significantly. The reason for
this is that the logistics staff, which is charged
with filling the requirement, also directly supervises
and rates the contracting officer. Several
contracting officers were attached to a division
during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Divisions have
no infrastructure to support a contracting officer and
therefore little understanding of how to utilize one.
This is why the contracting officers worked at the
Corps Acquisition Section and not at the division
level.... [Ref. 13:p. 13]
The preceding statement summarized a large problem that is
inherent throughout the Army. The rating system plays a large
part in the career of every officer. A subordinate must obey
legal orders from a superior. Mission accomplishment is the
ultimate measure of success or failure in the Army. To fail
offers the commander grounds to remove the non-performer.
Commanders realize the importance of mission accomplishment,
and their subordinates realize that their future depends on
their successes or failures. Staff members issue orders to
their subordinates in an attempt to accomplish their assigned
tasks. In the case of Contingency Contracting Officers, a
low-density specialty, e.g., two per division, the G4/S4 does
not want to hear that "it can not be done." The staff member
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may be unfamiliar with the FAR and other legal requirements
involved in contracting. The only thing everybody wants,
including the CCO, are results. A CCO faces a unique problem.
In many cases, the CCO's normal rating chain of command during
peacetime does not deploy during contingency operations. When
this is the case, the CCO must adapt to a new rater during
contingencies. The new rater has different expectations than
the garrison rater because of the difference in missions
between Installation contracting and contingency contracting.
Although the CCOs are actually assigned to DISCOM/COSCOM,
during periods of non-deployment, the logistics unit
leadership does not rate CCOs.
C. THE NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
1. Contingency Contracting Officers
During the initial stages of Desert Shield, the lack
of prior training and planning caused numerous problems for
CCOs and UOOs. As a result, the Army realized it needed to
develop a concept for contingency contracting situations. In
order to accomplish the task, the Army published a draft
concept for contingency contracting in July of 1992. First,
they defined the purpose, "to provide field commanders an
effective force multiplier of combat service support for
deployed forces." [Ref. 18:p. 2]
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The Army's concept states that it is important to
remember that first and foremost,
the mission of CCOs is to act as special staff
officers to the CDR, provide organic contracting
training and support in preparation for, and during
contingency operations. [Ref. 18:p. 3]
Even though the FAR, DFARS and AFARS contain various
requirements that CCOs must comply with, they still need to
support the commander.
The goals of the concept for CCOs are to:
(1) Reduce dependence on CONUS-based logistics
system.
(2) Improve response time.
(3) Free airlift and sealift.
(4) Augment existing logistics support.
(5) Consolidate CCOs into central offices when
appropriate.
(6) Ensure contracting solutions are considered in
planning. [Ref. 18:p. 4]
Even though the goals are logical, a problem still exists.
The concept does not address training for CCOs to prepare them
for duties during contingency operations. It does not address
the region-specific skills that a CCO needs. The integration
of the CCO into the logistics system is critical for
successful contingency contracting. Without proper prior
planning, the CCO becomes a reactive figure instead of
proactive. Of course, unforeseen situations will arise, but
proper planning and communication between the members of the
logistics system will help to minimize the impact of no-notice
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requirements. According to the Army's Operational Concept for
Contingency Contracting (Draft),
The concept combines separate contracting elements
located in COSCOM Headquarters and the COSCOM Material
Management Center (MMC) into a single contracting
element within the COSCOM Headquarters. The concept
adds a contracting element consisting of two officers
and supporting enlisted personnel to the Division
Support Command (DISCOM) Headquarters, and retains the
newly established contracting elements in ASGs and
CSGs. [Ref. 3:p. 4]
Assigning the CCOs to the COSCOM/DISCOM should aid in their
contribution to the integration of contracting into the
overall logistics support system. The CCOs should be able to
familiarize themselves with the normal requirements of the
supported units, and begin to plan for contingency situations
that already exist, or for future situations that may arise,
throughout the world. They will receive basic guidance from
the commander and the G4 channels. The G4 should become more
familiar with the abilities of, and constraints faced by the
CCO, and implement that information into the operational plan.
The guidance CCOs receive will enhance their ability to
determine the situations they may face in the future. This
should enable them to familiarize themselves with possible
areas of deployment ahead of time.
A second part of the concept states,
Unit Contracting Officers may work in the Directorate
of Contracting (DOC) at their installation to develop
skills necessary to maintain qualifications as
Contracting Officers, and maintain proficiency in
contracting laws and procedures. In order to remain
responsive to their units' requirements and
procedures, they should participate in field exercises
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and training with their parent unit. They also will
cooperate with G4 and other staff elements to assure
coordinated preparedness for deployment. [Ref. 3:p. 4]
By working in the DOC, the CCO can develop general contracting
skills.
Small purchases... are usually the greatest volume of
work in an installation contracting office. The same
will likely be true in any contingency contracting
situation. [Ref. l:p. 24]
Hands-on contracting experience is critical for CCOs since
that is their primary mission during a contingency situation.
However, they must remain in tune with the unit they will
support during deployments. This entails deploying on field
exercises, maintaining liaison with the logistics units, and
becoming proactive in the unit's contingency planning process.
Unlike peacetime contracting, they need to be able to support
the force without assistance.
2. Unit Ordering Officers
The important assistance CCOs receive during
deployments comes from UOOs.
Unit commanders nominate ordering officers from within
their organization. Nominated UOOs are then appointed
by persons authorized in AFARS 1.698. They receive
instructions and guidance from the Contracting
Officer, but are not assigned or attached to the
contracting element. [Ref. 3:p. 8]
It is critical that UOOs receive training on a recurring basis
so that in the event of a contingency, they can perform their
duties and relieve some of the CCO's burden. The UOO is the
most responsive source the commander has when needs arise.
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However, the UOO's actions/responsibilities must remain within
prescribed legal limits regardless of the situation.
D. SUNKARY
This chapter demonstrated why the Army developed a new
concept for contingency contracting. It reviewed various
problems the XVIII Airborne CAS encountered during the early
stages of Desert Shield. Those problem areas included:
regulatory requirements, the lack of responsiveness in the
supply system, the CCO's ability to determine a foreign
contractor's responsibility, and the training of CCOs and
UOOs. This chapter also discussed the new Army concept
developed in order to meet the challenges presented by
contingencies for CCOs in the future.
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IV. SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The necessity for a contingency contracting training
program evolved when the Army decided to assign CCOs to
DISCOMs and COSCOMs. The purpose of this survey is to
determine whether a viable training plan has been developed,
and if so, is the training plan successful? In order to
accomplish an assessment of current training, surveys were
sent to CCOs and their supervisors. The responses present a
snapshot of the effectiveness of the training program. The
training plan is in its infant stages and is proving to be
difficult to develop, since every conceivable contingency has
its own peculiarities. Since the Army defines training plans
for every type of unit and individual, the lack of attention
given to contingency contracting is somewhat of a surprise.
B. SURVEY DEVELOPHET
In order to assess the training CCOs receive, the research
has to address certain areas that could have an effect on the
eventual performance of their duties. The survey requests
information to help determine whether CCOs are utilized in an
effective manner which might prevent some of the problems
discussed earlier from reoccurring. The first area of concern
is to determine the CCO's normal duties in a garrison
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environment. More specifically, are they expected to conduct
duties as Contracting Officers or special projects officers?
Sometimes, Army officers in low-density branches receive
additional duties not associated with their specialty. Some
officers put a standard duty description on their OER Support
Form, but then they perform tasks not associated with their
position until it is time to deploy. As stated earlier, CCOs
need to be familiar with hands-on contracting.
The second area of concern addresses whether CCOs know
what field commanders expect from them during deployments, and
if their garrison duties prepare them to meet those demands.
The critical planning required prior to deployment stood out
as a glaring weakness during the literature review. The
researcher attempts to find whether assigning CCOs to
DISCOMs/COSCOMS helps to resolve the planning problems caused
by the CCO working in the Directorate of Contracting. The
questions are designed to allow the respondents to provide a
self-assessment of their ability to perform duties as a
deployed CCO. The goal is to determine if CCOs think the
training they receive would enable them to support deployed
forces in contingency situations.
The third area of concern addresses the working
relationship between CCOs and their assistants, UOOs and
enlisted assistants, during periods of non-deployment. As
stated previously, the UOOs should play an important role
during contingency operations. Since the CCOs are responsible
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for training U00s, there should be frequent interactions
between then concerning coordination f or the purchase of
needed supplies and services. In developing a Contracting
Support Plan, these interactions would aid CCOs during their
planning process prior to deployment.
To avoid a random selection of answers to the survey
questions, the respondents were asked to explain why they
chose their response to each question. In hope of obtaining
accurate responses, the anonymity was held confident by the
researcher. Names are provided only in order to contact
individuals where follow-up information is required.
The analysis of information consists of a comparison of
responses by current CCOs with problem areas previously
experienced by deployed CCOs. The background information
offers the opportunity to conduct comparisons by experience,
and level of skills attained. Finally, the overall responses
by CCO supervisors provide a contrast between the perceptions
of senior contracting personnel and those of current CCos.
C. SURVEY RESPONSES AND ANALYSIS
Surveys were sent to 23 individuals, with 18 of those
being CCOs. Fifteen surveys were returned for a response




The respondents' ranks range from Sergeant First
Class through Lieutenaant Colonel, and includes one civilian











b. Time in Service
The time in service (Table 4.2) gives the
impression that the respondents are a seasoned group of
military professionals. The majority of respondents, 86.67%,





____ ____ ___  _ ___ ____ ___(%)
5 < x < 10 2 13.33
10 < x < 15 6 40.00
x > 15 7 46.67
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c. Current Position:
As shown in Table 4.3, the majority of the
respondents, 66.67%, are CCOs. The positions held by the













Although no authorized position for a Contracting
NCO exists in the Army, the NCO respondent works in an
Acquisition Section and has experience. During garrison
operations, the Directors of Contracting assume the role as
CCO trainers.
d. Time in Position:
Comparing Table 4.2 with Table 4.4 shows a sharp
contrast between respondents time in their present positions
and their time in service. Over 86% of the respondents have
served two years or less in their current positions. The lack
of contracting experience proved to be a shortcoming during
past contingencies. Some of the respondents are so
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inexperienced, they are unable to assess the effectiveness of





0 < x <2 13 86.67
2<x 5 1 6.67
x > 5 1 6.67
Ironically, the only CCO with greater than two
years of experience is due for reassignment. The civilian
employee is the most experienced person serving in his current
position.
e. Do you have a Contracting Officer's Warrant?
The CCOs' ability to successfully complete their
duties depends on their ability to purchase supplies and
services for deployed forces. The CCO must be warranted to
obligate Government funds. Without warrants, CCOs are an
administrative burden. The percentage of warranted









Inclusion of the three Directors of Contracting inflates the
number of warranted respondents. These personnel would not
deploy for contingency operations, but ironically, they have
the responsibility to train CCos during non-deployed periods.
f. Now long have you had your warrant?
Table 4.6 shows the lack of experience among
respondents with warrants. The reader should keep in mind
that the requirement for a normal warrant is usually two years
of contracting experience, in addition to achieving required
levels of education. However, some of the respondents receive






____ ____  _ ___ ____ ___(%)
0<x~l 6 75.00
1 < x < 4 1 25.00
x > 4 1 25.00
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g. Highest level of education completed:
The educational achievements of the respondents
should lead the reader to believe that the Army is attempting
to comply with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement
Act, which requires Acquisition Corps members to obtain
advanced levels of education. The only individual without a











h. Government Contracting classes:
The respondents have attended many of the
Government contracting classes. The respondents lack of
participation in the Contract Administration class is one
discernable weakness. Given that the CCO must handle many
"cradle to grave" projects during deployments, the contract




Class I attended Class 
I attended
Mgmt Def Acq 15 Contract Law 10Contracting
(Basic)
Mgmt Def Acq 9 Cost & Pricing
Contracting (Basic)
(Advanced)
Small 9 Contract 2
Purchase Administration
i. Raters' and Senior Raters' Duty Positions:
Raters and senior raters have the ability to
mentor and improve the CCO's duty performance in the garrison
environment. However, the Garrison Commander and Director of
Contracting do not deploy. Unless the contracting function is
centralized under a senior Contracting Officer, the
contingency rating schie consists of senior logistics













Director of Contracting 7 46.67
(DOC)
Garrison Commander 4 26.67
Chief, Corps Acq 1 6.67
Corps G4 1 6.67




Senior Rater's Duty Position
Position c RelativeFrequency
Commanding General 2 13.33
Chief of Staff 2 13.33
Garrison Commander 4 26.67
Group Commander 1 6.67
Dep. Group Commander 1 6.67
G4 3 20.00
TChief, Corps Acq Section 1 6.67
Tables 4.9 and 4.10, illustrate a wide spectrum of
personnel in the CCO rating chains. The inconsistency in
rating chains demonstrates the lack of an established CCO
rating system. Some of the differences are due to the type of
unit and the assets available at the post. The CCO's primary
rater would not deploy in most instances. The responses show
that appropriate personnel rate the CCOs during non-deployed
periods. The majority of respondents will have different
raters if they deploy on contingency operations.
j. OER Support Form Duty Description:
The OER Support Form duty descriptions are used to
determine what CCOs perceive their jobs to be. The
respondents have similar ideas concerning their duty
descriptions. Some of the newer CCOs admit they do not fully
understand their jobs yet.
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2. Garrison Duties
The statements in the remaining sections of the survey
utilize the following scale to solicit input from the
respondents, in particular, the CCOs:
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree No Agree Strongly
Disagree Strong Agree
Opinion
The following sections afford the reader the
opportunity to study the respondents' answers to the survey
questions. Each box contains the responses on the bottom line
and the choices on the top. Additionally, each question
offers the respondent the opportunity to explain why they
chose their respective response. This section attempts to
determine what CCOs do during periods of non-deployment and
whether the duties they perform aid them in preparing for
contingency operations.
a. My OER Support Porn duty description matches my
daily duties.
E :roXY aImm V0 noMPT*oq M3rmm mW ongiy
0 0 4 5 1
There is no major discrepancy between CCOs' duty
descriptions and their actual Installation duties. Two of the
undecided individuals are very new to their assignments. The
NCO did not respond to this question. Based on the responses,
the CCOs do not receive special non-contracting projects. If
this is the case for CCOs, it should enhance their ability to
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train for contingencies. A special project usually takes up
inordinate amounts of the officer's time.
b. My garrison duties prepare me to conduct CCO
duties while deployed in support of a contingency
operation.
E t : x a g n:Vrn* onq mowmo j mW.z3nq1 y
0 1 3 4 3
Of the CCOs who strongly believe their garrison
duties prepare them for contingency operations, one is chief
of a contracting section, and two are lone CCOs at their unit.
The Contracting NCO disagrees and the newest officers can not
determine whether their duties prepare them or not. The
written responses indicate CCOs' garrison contracting duties
help, but do not totally prepare them for contingencies. A
sample of responses are:
1. Yes, because I do contracting work daily.
2. I am prepared but there is no training for actual
deployment.
3. My current duties help, but would not completely
prepare me for CCO.
Although the respondents feel they can perform CCO duties,
they believe the training could improve. Based on results
from previous contingencies, CCOs seem to be more aware of the
contingency requirements and are conducting hands-on training.
This should improve the ability of CCOs to provide support.
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c. X am heavily involved with the Directorate of
Contracting.
Smtoqly ±meqzm~ o ntzo1Mt WqrMm " morng ly
0 1 1 1 8
Responses are identical for daily and weekly
contact with the DOC. The data indicate CCOs are assigned to
positions which improve their contracting skills. This is in
keeping with the Army's operational contingency contracting
concept and lessons learned from Desert Shield. The data
indicate Ccos are gaining valuable hands-on contracting
experience, which was rated a major weakness during previous
contingency deployments.
d. I receive training for contingency contracting at
my home station.
di grm op nio inz~, q2 r
o 2 5 2 2
Even though four of the respondents state they
receive contracting training at their Installation, the
majority of the CCOs feel it lacks contingency training
aspects. Some of the comments are:
1. I perform self-training.
2. All preparations for deployment are my own. There
is no guidance provided.
3. I have worked on SOPs (Standing Operating
Procedures) and put together a contingency
contracting text.
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4. I have not seen or been exposed to any specific
contingency contracting training.
The majority of contingency contracting training for CCOs
seems to be self-taught. The Army's contingency concept is
also vague concerning specific CCO contingency training. As
stated earlier in Chapter III, the concept calls for units to
provide specific contingency training. Based on the responses
listed above, not all of the units are in compliance.
Although the DOC is responsible for training the CCO, the DOC
is not deployable. Because of this, the DOC may not have the
knowledge, or desire, to perform region-specific training.
e. I am sufficiently trained at home station to be
able to deploy and conduct contingency
contracting.
iont~lqy di~maqz no mt~onq mqz• wtz~niqy
0 1 2 4 4 1 1
Three of the five respondents who agree, deployed
during actual contingency operations. The two respondents who
disagree also have actual contingency deployment experience.
The literature review revealed that Contracting Officers were
unprepared to conduct contingency contracting in the past.
The survey responses indicate a better level of preparation by
current CCOs even thc" ) they believe training needs to
improve. The education Contracting Officers receive, combined
with the hands-on experience they obtain during non-deployed
periods, enables CCOs to possess the basic contracting skills.
CCOs believe the contracting skills help prepare them, but the
56
addition of region-specific training will complete the
training package, in accordance with the Army contingency
contracting concept.
3. Contingency Contracting Experience
a. I have experience as a CCO.
m~~ro~ly dimagzm no mtonq g~ toy
0L 2 o2I 2 j
Approximately 64% of the respondents have CCO
experience. By virtue of being assigned to a CCO position,
some respondents consider themselves experienced. For
example, one respondent with less than five months time in his
position "considers himself an experienced CCO, but is not
warranted". Another, who has been a CCO for nearly two years
considers himself to "have no experience due to the lack of a
deployment." While their circumstances differ, the answers
provide a range of opinions concerning experience. Since the
AAC requires Contracting Officers to remain single-tracked
within the contracting field, the experience factor variances
should fade as experienced Contracting Officers become CCOs.
b. I have experience as a deployed CCO.
1 1 3 5
Almost 73% of the CCOs deployed on either
contingency deployments or training exercises. The five who
strongly agree, deployed during actual contingencies to
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include Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. One of those who
deployed to Somalia during Restore Hope stated:
"The amount of contracting they conducted in country was
minimal. Most transactions were coordinated through other
agencies located in other countries." The situation in
Somalia indicates a sample of the problems CCOs must plan for.
They can be deployed on short notice to unfamiliar areas. If
they have an idea of what to expect upon arrival, they can
provide better support.
c. I agree with the current definition of a CCO.
0 1 6 3 1
The research provides a concrete definition as
stated in Chapter I. Many responses indicate a lack of
familiarity with the definition. Some of the comments are:
1. What is the definition?
2. As defined by who/what?
3. I haven't seen the current definition.
4. Not sure which definition you refer to.
DoD's definition is not long and drawn out. In fact, it is
fairly succinct and to the point. The researcher assesses the
lack of familiarity with the definition as a weakness. As a
CCO, the officer should know the definition of his job title.
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d. My garrison duties parallel the duties of a
deployed CCO.
mlzOagqy d&i. m ttm wio mlzog aqz-ao mt~nxaq y
E 0 415 1 1
Only one CCO who deployed previously, agrees with
this statement. The responses indicate a disconnect between
the contracting requirements in a remote area and the training
CCOs receive at an installation. It is difficult to replicate
contingency contracting situations at Installations. However,
this does not justify lack of contingency training. The lack
of contingency training for CCOs represents a basic problem
with Army contingency contracting. The Army training
philosophy is to train as you will fight. Though
contingencies may not involve fighting, the principle holds
true, i.e., during garrison operations, CCOs do not train to
operate as they would during deployments. The researcher's
assessment is that a stronger link between the DISCOM/COSCOM
planning cells and CCOs may provide a better training scenario
for CCOs.
e. Based on my level of training, I could provide
immediate support to a deployed force.
0 0 2 4 5
A CCO's primary mission is to provide immediate
support to deployed forces. The majority of respondents
believe they can provide immediate support to deployed forces.
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Except for the newest Contracting Officers assigned to CCO
positions, the respondents think they can accomplish their
mission. The literature review indicated that during previous
contingency deployments, Contracting Officers could not
adequately support forces. Based on previous questions, there
appears to be little evidence of contingency training besides
self-preparation. A majority of the respondents indicate CCO
garrison duties do not parallel duties while deployed. Given
this information CCOs must rely on their own training and
previous experience to explain their confidence level. It
appears that the Army needs to re-evaluate and define
proficiency levels for CCOs.
f. My training prepares me for the unisue
requirements of CcOs, e.g., language barriers,
lack of sources, currency, control of Unit/Field
Ordering Officers (UO~s/FOOs).
1 1 4 2 3
The CCOs who believe their training prepares them,
consists of CCOs who participate in field exercises or have
actually deployed during contingencies. The majority of those
who disagree, respond that "no specific CCO training exists."
Units plan for specific contingency areas. The DISCOM/COSCOM
should be able to provide the CCO enough information to
prepare a training plan for known areas. The failure to
incorporate CCOs into planning cells is probably the main
reason for the lack of region-specific training, a major
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requirement for contingency contracting. One respondent
writes, "I'm aware of these training problems, and like any
other officer, you develop solutions and drive on." Of course
the CCO must develop solutions, but the support will improve
dramatically if CCOs receive region-specific training prior to
deployments. CCOs will not find themselves in constant
reactive modes.
4. Training Effectiveness
a. I have suggestions that could improve training for
CCOs.
m~ronqly 4imaqraea~e Y%•l mI~~~tZrq
1 0 5 3 2
Most of those who agree with this statement fail
to offer input, while those with no strong opinion provide
comments. One response sums up what seems to be the key to
the contingency contracting training problem.
It's hard to have suggestions when no real guidance
has been provided to you. I try to get as much
information as possible but am a rarity here.... No
one here 'really' understands what I do. There is no
urgency until it comes time for deployment.
Overlooking contingency contracting support until time for
deployment probably happens because CCOs work in the non-
deployable DOC. Although continuous logistics planning
occurs, CCOs are not involved. As a result, they perceive a
lack of training guidance. Thus, it becomes difficult for the
CCO to train or prepare in a realistic manner. Another part
of the problem stems from the fact that some newly designated
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Contracting Officers are assigned to CCO positions. Another
response states, "Suggestions are difficult because it takes
at least one year of contracting experience to be familiar
with all the rules and regulations." The Army's Contingency
Contracting Concept attempts to alleviate the training problem
by having the DOC train CCOs at the Installation. The
researcher's assessment of DOC training is that CCOs receive
basic contracting training, but fail to receive region-
specific contracting training.
b. X think ALKC should develop a course to educate
CCOs.
stronqly dminlqrm• rno msx-ron tgr~ s~o y
di. zr~ opinion agzes
71 0 1 3 6
The overwhelming majority agree with this
statement. The only respondent who disagrees wants "a clear
policy on contracting doctrine as the #1 priority." The
Army's position that "training for contracting officers
remains the primary responsibility of the U.S. Army Logistics
Management College (ALMC)" (Ref. 3:p. 4], should support a
class for CCOs, or for those responsible for training CCOs.
The researcher's assessment is that ALMC assumes the basic
contracting education responsibility, but feels the
contingency aaspects should be handled at the unit level.
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c. My daily duties allow me to obtain and retain the
requisite skills of a CCO.
0 2 4 4 1
The CCOs generally believe that Installation
contracting experience does help them obtain and maintain the
requisite contracting skills. There is a problem though, as
one experienced CCO states,
My daily duties involve Post/Camp/Station contracting
which I believe is the closest parallel to CCO
available. It still falls very short of providing all
of the skills necessary.
Part of the training problem is that some CCOs are relatively
inexperienced in contracting. Therefore, they have to learn
contracting through a series of classes and OJT. By spending
so much time learning how to be Installation Contracting
Officers, new CCOs do not prepare themselves for contingency
operations. The assignment of more experienced Contracting
Officers to CCO positions might prevent some of the
contracting problems that have happened in the past.
5. Coordination and Assistance
a. I plan for contingencies with the G4 and
DISCON/COSCON reps.
C1MMgrt' n= oq gram - Yax
1 2 3 3 2
Two of the respondents who agree are not assigned
to a division or a corps asset. Another, who strongly agrees
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said, "it has gotten better over the last 6-12 months, but
needs more planning together to act instead of react." This
statement leads the researcher to believe that planning is not
as effective as it needs to be. One of the CCOs states,
I have worked with reps from the G4 on several
deployments. As the reps change I tend to get left
out of the planning process and get remembered as the
wheels go up on the plane.
For the CCO to be involved, there must be two-way
communication. If CCOs do not attempt to actively participate
in the planning process, they will probably be left out. The
result might resemble the rocky starts witnessed during Desert
Shield or Grenada.
b. I conduct training for UOOs/FOFs, maintain a
current list of trained U00s, track UO0 turnover
and feel they are capable of performing their
duties.
mtronqly disagree no mtronqg I mq z•• y
32 4 1
After the discussion about the importance of UOOs
earlier, the response to this statement provides unexpected
results. only one CCO assigned to a division or corps,
conducts training for UOOs. The majority of responses
indicate the DOC conducts training for UOOs. It appears CCOs
have not learned the importance of ensuring UOOs are capable
of performing their duties in a satisfactory, coordinated
manner. The research revealed high turnover rates among UOOs
is not uncommon. Relying on the DOC for UOO training leaves
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CCOs unable to place names with faces. Simply communicating
at training sections will help avoid unfamiliarity.
Familiarity between the CCO and UOOs aids the CCO in
monitoring UQOs activities. Failing to have CCOs conduct UOO
training could lead to the same UOO problems experienced
during Desert Shield.
c. I feel confident in my current system of
accounting for U0 purchases.
dimaqzea opinion
2 1 5 3 0
The research has shown the CCO is responsible for
monitoring UOOs' expenditures. The response to this statement
indicates a lack of responsibility by some of the CCOs. The
three who agree, all have experience during actual contingency
operations. The remainder believe the DOC is responsible for
UOOs. Relying on the DOC is an easy solution during non-
deployment, but the DOC will not deploy with the CCO during a
contingency. As prior experiences have shown, the CCO's
familiarity with what UOOs were buying enabled them to monitor
the overall needs of the unit. The researcher's assessment is
that CCO dependency on the DOC to conduct training could
reduce the CCO's ability to ensure UOOs remain within their
procurement limits during future contingencies.
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d. I work with the administrative assistants who
would deploy with as on a regular basis.
I mronq1ly 4±mqxro no~ mon qwo• I*rong ly
3 3 3 2 0
The responses indicate a weakness in the Army
contingency contracting arena. According to the contingency
contracting concept, "There are two enlisted personnel
assigned to the division contracting section." [Ref. 18:p. 4]
In reality, there are few enlisted administrative personnel in
place. One respondent writes, "the Army does not have
administrative assistants for contracting -- big problem! The
Air Force and Navy have enlisted contracting officer MOSs."
Enlisted administrative personnel need to receive training.
This will help educate them. Trained administrative
assistants will also ease the administrative burden
experienced by CCOs during past deployments. The researcher
assesses the lack of peacetime communication between CCOs and
their enlisted assistants to be a problem area. Without
proper communication during periods of non-deployment, it is
unrealistic to expect smooth operations during contingencies.
6. Future Deployment Scenarios
a. I feel the lessons learned from Desert
Shield/Storm enable CCOs to plan for future
contingencies better.
Im*~onrq 2y Idimaqze• no i~rnt•n mqxoa m~~onq .y
0 0 7 3 1
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Although no one disagrees with the statement,
there are some interesting comments about the lessons learned.
Some of those are:
The Army quickly forgets lessons learned as people
move from position to position. So we remake the
wheel.
Good idea to have CCOs, but the time it takes to train
them may make them impractical in the future.
I've learned a lot by reading AARs and talking to CCOs
that deployed to the desert.
Especially true for a large scale deployment such as
two or more corps.
Based on the number of respondents with no strong opinion, it
appears the Army needs to get the information to CCOs. The
idea of reinventing the wheel every time a contingency arises
shows a lack of standards for CCOs to follow. Someone needs
to develop a basic CCO training program. The decision to make
Contracting Officers single-track in contracting jobs should
afford CCOs the ability to learn from past mistakes. This
should help them prevent repeating past mistakes.
b. I/we conduct planning for contingencies with
little or no infrastructure for peacekeeping
operations, humanitarian missions, etc.
I •ro:Jgr~m d~mmqroa no r~ntgx aqros j tronlgi
4 2 4 1 0
The intent of this question was to determine
whether CCOs plan for possible contingency areas where
supplies are limited or non-existent. As discussed throughout
this thesis, planning is one of the most important facets in
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allowing CCOs to become combat multipliers during deployments.
Based on the responses to this statement, contingency
contracting planning is not taking hold at unit level. These
responses directly contradict the responses to the previous
question concerning planning. The responses indicate a come
as you are attitude. As a result, CCOs who deployed to
Somalia had "nothing to buy, reliability was zero, and quality
was worthless. The CCO had to go to Kenya to purchase."
Without prior market knowledge, the CCO's ability to provide
support to the deployed force is undoubtedly impaired. If
CCOs fail to support the force's urgent requirements, CCOs
fail to accomplish their missions.
7. Additional Comments
Finally, the survey offers participants the
opportunity to provide any additional comments concerning
areas the survey fails to address. Several of the CCOs offer
the following insights:
There are some fundamental problems with the Army's
Contingency Contracting Program. First, there is no
program. Only after notification of deployment does
the Army begin to think about Contracting Officers -
too late. A CCO should be one of the most experienced
- not a situation to put beginners.
It is important that higher look at the operation,
evaluate it as it is, and not try to have an 0-5/0-6
try to create a 40+ person DOC with themselves as
Director and thus create their own position.
Contingency contracting should be used to secure
goods/services as quickly as possible until the normal
supply situation comes on line....
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I have really had to train myself as far as planning
for a contingency.... Commanders and their staffs do
not really understand what I do or how I do it (or do
they really care as long as I get them what they
want). So when we deploy I feel like they learn more
about what I do and in that light I am training them
in our capabilities.
The current "Big Plan" is if another large-scale
deployment occurs, FORSCOM (Forces Command) will task
all subunits for their CCOs and create a team. This
means I'll be yanked from my unit to work for another
headquarters.
The Army is shrinking. An AAC Officer does not really
want to start his career working contingency
contracting. When you are a CCO you are on your own
because you have no mentors or peers.... It takes two
years to obtain requisite contracting experience to
become warranted.., by the time you accomplish this
hurdle, the time for rotation is approaching.
The comments present interesting information for the research.
First, CCOs need contracting experience prior to assignment to
CCO billets. Second, non-contracting personnel who become
involved with contingencies should become more aware of what
CCOs can and can not do for them. Finally, despite having the
authorization for CCOs at unit level, the "Hey you" method of
selection still exists during contingency deployments.
In contrast to the majority of CCOs" responses, the
senior personnel who participated in the survey feel the Army
is moving in the right direction. Some of their comments
include:
Deployable divisions must have readily deployable
Contracting Officers. The contingency contracting
concept is an excellent concept but without clear
documentation on the MTOE identifying these personnel,
they tend to be assigned where most needed - not to
contracting positions. Failure to use these personnel
in acquisition positions leads to erosion of skills,
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lapse of warrants, and ultimately non-preparedness to
support deployments.
Overall - we're on the right track, but still have a
ways to go.
I worked on a Contingency Contracting Handbook while
at DA. Input from all MACO~s, AMC, ARCOM, Air Force
and AARs on Panama, Honduras and Saudi was included.
In conjunction, the handbook explained training
programs by experience and schools the DOC was to
establish... All the issues you've addressed and more
are in the handbook if DA would release it.
The draft copy of the handbook, is still going through a final
review. The handbook, if as stated above, will provide the
necessary guidance CCOs and units need to effectively
coordinate contracting support for contingency deployments.
The senior personnel realize that problems exist, but with the
exception of the officer who worked on the book, do not seem
to be pushing for solutions.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the results of the survey sent to
CCOs, and some senior contracting personnel who do not deploy
during contingencies. The researcher analyzed current CCOs'
responses by comparing them with problems areas faced by
previously deployed CCOs. From that comparison, the research
shows some questions need to be addressed. The Army is taking
steps in the right direction, but needs to answer the
following questions:
1. Should they assign new Contracting Officers to CCO
positions?
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2. Is there enough information and guidance for CCOs to
prepare themselves for contingency situations during
periods of non-deployment?
3. Although CCOs work in the DOC to improve contracting
skills, what is the proper balance between training
and working with the DISCOM/COSCOM staff to prepare
for contingencies?
4. Who should conduct the training for UOOs and how much
interaction should the CCO and UOO have during non-
deployed periods?
These questions provide the basis for the researcher's
conclusions.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECONNENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study is to determine whether the
training CCOs receive during garrison operations prepares them
for contracting during contingency operations. This section
presents the conclusions of the study.
1. Experience
The Army should not assign new or inexperienced
Contracting Officers to CCO positions. Inexperienced
Contracting Officers in deployed CCO positions find themselves
in an environment quite unlike their contracting jobs at
Installation DOCs. Because the AAC brings officers into
Functional Area 97 at approximately their eighth year in
service, Contracting Officers have to learn a system that is
complicated enough, besides requiring unique CCO
responsibilities. The skills required of Contracting Officers
do not lend themselves to OJT, although learning on the job
is certainly better than no training. The Defense Acquisition
University offers mandatory courses for Contracting Officers
to obtain basic skills necessary for contracting. However,
contingency contracting is not among the subjects offered.
The AAC should place experienced Contracting Officers in the
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CCO positions whenever possible. The CCO positions should not
be initial positions for Contracting Officers.
2. Guidance
The Army needs to provide more comprehensive training
guidance in the area of contingency contracting. The lack of
published training guidance leaves CCOs the unenviable task of
training themselves to perform a mission with little or no
prior notice. The DOCs train them how to perform Installation
contracting and small purchases, but do not prepare them for
the unknown contracting circumstances for deployments to
remote foreign areas. The training needs to emphasize not
only the "how to" for CCOs, but also the region-specific
training that will enable CCOs to support field commanders
during contingency deployments. Although the DOC is qualified
to train the CCO in contracting functions, the CCO needs to
also train with the DISCOM/COSCOM to remain familiar with
possible contingency operations.
3. Garrison Duties
Although the CCOs work in the DOC, they should not be
isolated from the logistical staff and units they support
during contingencies. There seems to be a communication gap
between the CCOs and the logistical support chain-of-command.
The G4/S4 does not use the CCO as a planning asset. The CCOs
need to stay abreast of the logistical needs of the units that
will deploy during contingencies. They should monitor the
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pulse of the unit as part of their everyday duties. The time
to address contingency contracting should not be at "wheels
up", it should be a recurring process. Units with CCOs need
to include them in their contingency planning sessions to
allow them to support deployed forces to the maximum extent
possible. The new types of missions the Army recently
assumed, provide a stronger mandate for strengthening the
CCOs' ability to conduct their missions.
4. UOO Training
The CCOs should assume more responsibility for the
pre-deployment training of UOOs. They should ensure that a
solid line of communication exists between themselves and the
UOOs. The CCOs should not let the DOCs assume total
responsibility for training the UO0s. Communication with the
UOOs would improve the CCO's knowledge of the various unit
needs. Although commanders assume the ultimate responsibility
for the conduct of their UO0, the CCO can reduce the amount of
required oversight by the commander and himself if he prepares
the UOO properly. The turnover of UO0s can also be controlled
better if the CCOs keep accurate rosters.
5. Feasibility
The plan to support deployed divisions with two CCOs
during contingency operations, may not be feasible if whenever
possible, the Army plans to consolidate CCOs in a centralized
location. During Desert Shield, when the XVIII Airborne CAS
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consolidated the Contracting Officers at one location, the
commanders complained about the response time. The Army's new
concept places the CCOs in divisions to ensure responsiveness
to the commanders' needs. The Army needs to decide which way
they will operate and develop contingency training.
B. REOO(EDATIONS
1. Internal Resources
The Army is not utilizing internal personnel who are
available to assist in contingency contracting. The supply
system is run by Warrant Officers and NCOs at the user level
-- Ugh. The development of a new Military Occupational
Specialty (MOS) for contracting specialists would help to
educate enlisted personnel. These personnel would provide
valuaole assistance to CCOs. The technical expertise of NCOs
has been a trademark i1r Lne Army since its inception. There
is no reason besides Army self-imposed personnel livits that
would preclude the Army from following the example set by the
other Services. Contracting could become a secondary MOS if
the personnel limits do not allow for the development of a new
primary MOS.
2. Guidance
If the guidance discussed at the end of Chapter IV is
available for CCOs to use in the field, ensure the expedient
distribution of that guidance to DOCs and CCOs, even in draft
format. The concept of CCOs in divisions is relatively new.
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There is not an established set of standards for CCOs to
determine whether they have reached a proficient contingency
training level. The only way for them to f ind out is by
actually deploying and supporting deployed forces during
contingencies. The differences between "peacetime" and
contingency contracting can reach extremes. The manual under
consideration for contingency contracting should be
distributed in draft so CCOs, their trainers, and commanders
will understand what CCOs can and should do.
3. Planning Process
Ensure CCOs participate in the contingency planning
process for deployments and exercises. Units need to ensure
CCOs do not become so entrenched in learning basic contracting
skills that they fail to actively participate in logistics
planning sessions. CCOs need to be proactive to better
prepare themselves for deployment. The interaction between
CCOs, G4/S4 staff, and DISCOM/COSCOM representatives, should
occur routinely. The new evolving Army missions will require
more contingency deployments. This should result in
additional contingency planning. The CCOs should be included
in those planning cells at all levels.
4. Size of Contracting Element
Examine whether the number of contracting personnel
assigned to deployable units is adequate to perform the
mission required of Ccos. If the plan is to augment
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contracting sections during large deployments, it leads one to
wonder whether two CCOs per division is a large enough
contingent. The Army needs to look closely at whether the
augmentation of contracting sections is consistent with the
reason for placing them within the divisions to begin with.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How should the Army train and utilize Contingency
Contracting Officers in order to maintain the ability
to execute their duties in the event of a deployment?
The personnel responsible for training CCOs need to
find the right balance between formal education and OJT for
contracting. Additionally, the CCOs need to become active in
the unit logistics planning process. The Army needs to
provide CCOs and their trainers specific guidance concerning
CCO responsibilities. The guidance should enable the CCOs to
become combat multipliers.
2. What is the purpose of the CCO and what are the
primary duties of the CCO?
The purpose of the CCO is "t, provide field commanders
an effective force multiplier of combat service support for
deployed forces." (Ref. 18:p. 2] The CCO accomplishes this
purpose by performing the following duties:
1. Training Unit Ordering Officers prior to deployment.
2. Preparing the Contracting Support Plan.
3. Maintaining a contracting support kit and the
ability to deploy early in support of contingency
forces.
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4. Augmenting the supply system once it is in place to
provide support. [Ref. 18:p. 3]
3. What are the unique requirements of the CCO?
The unique requirements of the CCO include the ability
to:
1. Conduct business according to the customs of foreign
countries while remaining in accordance with FAR
requirements.
2. Locate sources in foreign countries without standard
means of communication, e.g., telephones, computer
networks, available in domestic contracting.
3. Work with purchase request originators who are
unfamiliar with contracting procedures as well as
FAR requirements.
4. Monitor multiple UOOs who are geographically
dispersed and under the control of their commanders.
5. Meet the urgent needs of the commander when no
existing supply system is established.
6. Function without the civilian expertise available in
normal contracting situations.
4. What is the best method to obtain and maintain the
CCO's requisite skills?
The best way to obtain the requisite skills is to
ensure officers are thoroughly trained in basic contracting
procedures, e.g., small purchases, FAR requirements, prior to
assigning them to CCO positions. The CCOs should study the
business cultures of their units' possible contingency areas.
The CCOs should work in the DOC to maintain their
contracting skills, but should divide their time between
contracting and contingency preparation. Units should
integrate CCOs into the logistics planning cell. The CCOs
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need to remain aware of all unit activities so they have a
solid knowledge base of unit needs.
5. Who are the principal sources of CCO assistance during
deployment periods and what training do these
personnel receive?
The main source of assistance is the UOO. DOCs have
assumed responsibility for UOO training.
6. What deployment scenarios might a CCO face in the
future and how should the CCO be employed during
preparation?
The possible future contingency locations include
various regions around the world. Effective planning is
extremely difficult because the time for deployment is
unknown. Planning occurs, but regional differences vary so
much that a plan might be outdated depending on when the
deployment occurs. Presently, the US is contemplating
deployments to Haiti and Bosnia. The deployment to Somalia is
ongoing. The range of cultures within those three countries
is enormous, but the business cultures can be studied. The
peacekeeping missions the US is contemplating will expand the
role of CCOs. The possibility of future deployments
reinforces the previous assertion that CCOs need to be an
integral part of the planning process.
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Officers v. Non-Comissioned Officers as CCOs
Is there any reason besides the current legal
requirement that Contracting Officers be commissioned
officers? Is it feasible for NCOs to be CCOs?
2. Army Contracting Knowledge at Comuands outside the
Acquisition Corps
Does the Army leadership have enough knowledge of
contracting to use it effectively? If not, what should the
Army do to increase the level of understanding among its
leaders?
3. The Size of the Contracting Sections
Are two CCO billets per division adequate contracting
support during deployment of a full division? Given lessons






From: CPT Kelly N. Campbell
To: Survey Participants
1. Subject: Contingency Contracting Officer(CCO) Training
2. Purpose. The purpose of this survey is to gather data
for my thesis. The goal of the research is to determine
whether the training CCOs receive at their installations
during peacetime prepares them to perform their duties during
an actual contingency.
3. General Information. I am a student at the Naval
Postgraduate School, pursuing a Masters Degree in Acquisition
and Contract Management. The questions posed in this survey
are designed to provide necessary data to determine whether
the training program for CCOs is sufficient to allow them to
conduct their requisite duties during contingencies. The
scaled answers provide me an objective rating of how the CCO
rates the training he/she receives. The format provides space
for respondents to provide narratives of a subjective manner.
If additional space is required, feel free to continue on the
reverse side of the sheet.
The information acquired during the research is held in
complete confidence. Your name and telephone number will
provide the opportunity for me to contact you for any follow-
up information that might be necessary. This is an
educational exercise, but if the research determines patterns
that need to be addressed concerning CCO training, the thesis
will provide recommendations to appropriate commands. No
surveys will be included in any package.
4. Instructions. Fill in the blanks of the background
information section. The objective questions utilize scaled
responses ranging from 1 to 5. The responses correspond to
the following answers:
1 2 3 4 5




After you answer the objective rating, explain why you
chose the respective response in the space provided below each
question. If you feel there is additional information to
provide that has not been requested, feel free to send any
additional comments in the package you idail back in the
envelope provided. For locations with more than one
respondent, please consolidate surveys and return in the same
envelope.
5. Because of the survey population, please expedite the
completion of the survey. It is critical to my research that
I receive your responses prior to the 15th of September.
6. Finally, I realize that your time is at a premium. The
survey is designed to take approximately 30 minutes to an hour
to complete. I appreciate your cooperation in completing and




Section 1: Background Information
1. Name: Phone#:
2. Rank: 3. Time in Service:
4. Current Position:
5. Time in Position:
6. Do you have a Contracting Officer's Warrant?
7. How long have you had your warrant?
8. Unit of Assignment:
9. Highest level of education completed:
10. Govt contracting classes( list all )
11. Rater's Duty Position:
12. Senior Rater's Duty Position:
13. OER Support Form Duty Description:
Section 2: Garrison Duties
a. My OER Support form duty description matches my daily
duties.
1 2 3 4 5
b. My garrison duties prepare me to conduct CCO duties
while deployed in support of a contingency operation...
1 2 3 4 5
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C. I am heavily involved with the Directorate of
Contracting...
daily
1 2 3 4 5
weekly
1 2 3 4 5
d. I receive training for contingency contracting at my
home station.
1 2 3 4 5
e. I am sufficiently trained at home station to be able
to deploy and conduct contingency contracting.
1 2 3 4 5
Section 3: Contingency Contracting Experience
a. I have experience as a CCO.
1 2 3 4 5
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b. I have experience as a deployed CCO.
1 2 3 4 5
c. I agree with the current definition of a CCO.
1 2 3 4 5
d. My garrison duties parallel the duties of a deployed
CCO.
1 2 3 4 5
e. Based on my level of training, I could provide
immediate support to a deployed force.
1 2 3 4 5
f. My training prepares me for the unique requirements of
CCOs, e.g., language barriers, lack of sources, currency,
control of Field Ordering Officers(FOOs).
1 2 3 4 5
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Section 4: Training Effectiveness
a. I have suggestions that could improve training for
CCOs.
1 2 3 4 5
b. I think ALMC should develop a course to educate CCOs.
1 2 3 4 5
c. My daily duties allow me to obtain and retain the
requisite skills of a CCO.
1 2 3 4 5
Section 5: Coordination and Assistance
a. I plan for contingencies with the G4 and DISCOM/COSCOM
reps.
1 2 3 4 5
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b. I conduct training for Field Ordering Officers,
maintain a current list of trained FOOs, track FOO turnover
and feel they are capable of performing their duties.
1 2 3 4 5
c. I feel confident in my current system of accounting
for FOO purchases.
1 2 3 4 5
d. I work with the administrative assistants who would
deploy with me on a regular basis.
12 3 4 5
Section 6: Future Deployment Scenarios
a. I feel the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm
enable CCOs to plan for future contingencies better.
1 2 3 4 5
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b. I/we conduct planning for contingencies with little or
no infrastructure for peacekeeping operations,
humanitarian missions, etc.




A. List of Abbreviations
AAC - Army Acquisition Corps
AAR - After Action Review
AFARS - Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
ALMC - Army Logistics Management College
AMC - Army Materiel Command
ASG - Area Support Group
CAS - Corps Acquisition Section
CCO - Contingency Contracting Officer
CID - Criminal Investigative Division
COSCOM - Corps Support Command
CSG - Corps Support Group
CSS - Combat Service Support
DFARS - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DISCOM - Division Support Command
DLA - Defense Logistics Agency
DLSIE - Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
DOC - Director of Contracting
DoD - Department of Defense
FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulation
FOO - Field Ordering Officer
FORSCOM - Forces Command
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G4 - Assistant Chief of Staff, (Logistics)
HNS - Host Nation Support
MACON - Major Command
NMC - Material Management Center
MOS - Military Occupational Specialty
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OER - Officer Efficiency Report
OJT - On-the-Job Training
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
RDF - Rapid Deployment Force
SOP - Standing Operating Procedure
TAC - Tactical Air Command
TO&E - Table of Organization and Equipment
UOO - Unit Ordering Officer
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